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• We aim at detecting rogue behaviors.
• We claim that fraud data are essentially based on graphs.
• We consider NoSQL graph databases.
• We propose fuzzy historical pattern matching.
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A B S T R A C T
Rogue behaviors refer to behavioral anomalies that can occur in human activities and that
can thus be retrieved from human generated data. In this paper, we aim at showing that
NoSQL graph databases are a useful tool for this purpose. Indeed these database engines
exploit property graphs that can easily represent human and object interactions whatever
the volume and complexity of the data. These interactions lead to fraud rings in the
graphs in the form of sophisticated chains of indirect links between fraudsters representing
successive transactions (money, communications, etc.) from which rogue behaviours are
detected. Our work is based on two extensions of such NoSQL graph databases. The
first extension allows the handling of time-variant data while the second one is devoted
to the management of imprecise queries with a DSL (to define flexible operators and
operations with Scala) and the Cypherf declarative flexible query language over NoSQL
graph databases. These extensions allow to better address and describe sophisticated
frauds. Feasibility have been studied to assess our proposition.
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Rogue behaviors are known to lead to important economic
and political concerns. Frauds in banks and insurance
companies represent billions of dollars lost every year. For
instance, more than £52 billion was lost in the UK in 2013 [1].
Fraud can be detected by considering abnormal patterns in
the interactions. However, these anomalies are hidden and
often difficult to retrieve because of their complexity. Fraud
can be committed by one or more persons. It can impact on
individuals or organizations (e.g., banks).
As rogue behaviors are characterized by the interactions,
graphs can thus help for retrieving frauds. Graphs are in-
deed recognized to play an important role within the pattern
recognition field [2], thus being a key technology for retrieving
relevant information. Graphs efficiently represent the rela-
tionships between objects, should they refer to persons, orga-
nizations, or scientific data (e.g., chemistry). Techniques and
algorithms can be distinguished in considering the fact that
they are meant to mine relevant patterns or to retrieve them.
Detection is achieved through the modelization of fraud
rings which are hidden within the graph of interactions. A
fraud ring is a set of connections between actors. It can be
found in many fraud frameworks [1].
Although graphs have been studied since the very
beginning of computer science in the so-called graph theory
field [3], their integration within database management
systems is more recent. Some of the first systems have been
proposed with the emergence of ontologies and RDF triplets
queried through SPARQL [4]. More recently, NoSQL databases
have proposed efficient engines devoted to graph databases:
GraphDB, Neo4J, etc. [5] compares some of these engines and
points the advantages of the Neo4J system, which is the one
we consider.
In this paper, we propose a framework for defining fuzzy
temporal pattern matching from NoSQL graph databases. For
this purpose, we first recall the basic concepts of NoSQL graph
databases, temporal queries and graph pattern matching in
Section 2. We then detail the problemwe address in Section 3,
before presenting a first attempt for addressing the problem
using the NoSQL Neo4j graph database in Section 4. The
proposition has been implemented. The main contribution
of this paper is presented in Section 5. This contribution is
mainly based on the use of generalized fuzzy queries. These
queries can be user-defined and rely on a Domain Specific
Language (DSL) and on an extension of the declarative query
language to better address and describe sophisticated frauds.
Section 6 reviews the main contributions from the literature
related to rogue detection. Section 7 sums up this paper and
presents the future work we would like to address.
2. Preliminary statements
2.1. Graphs
Graphs have been studied for a long time by mathematicians
and computer scientists. A graph can be directed or not. It is
defined as follows.Fig. 1 – Labeled graph.
Definition 1 (Graph). A graph G is given by a pair (V,E) where
V stands for a set of vertices and E stands for a set of edges
with E ⊆ (V × V).
Definition 2 (Directed Graph). A directed graph G is given by a
pair (V,E) where V stands for a set of vertices and E stands
for a set of edges with E ⊆ {V × V}. That is E is a subset of all
ordered permutations of V element pairs.
When used in real world applications, graphs need to be
provided with the capacity to label nodes and relations, thus
leading to the so-called labeled graphs, or property graphs as
shown in Fig. 1 and defined below:
Definition 3 (Labeled Oriented Graph). A labeled oriented graph
G, also known as oriented property graph, is given by a
quadruplet (V,E, α, β) where V stands for a set of vertices and
E stands for a set of edges with E ⊆ {V×V}, α stands for the set
of attributes defined over the nodes, and β the set of attributes
defined over the relations.
Given such graphs, it is possible to retrieve subgraphs, as
described below.
2.2. Graph pattern matching and querying
Graph pattern matching is a very difficult algorithmic
problem that has lead to the production of many works. We
focus here on the definition and usage of pattern matching
queries. Some related works are presented in Section 6.
The goal of pattern matching is to retrieve a pattern from
data. In graph pattern matching, the pattern and the source
data are both organized as graphs, as illustrated in Fig. 2.
More formally, graph pattern matching amounts to re-
trieve all occurrences of a graph pattern Q from a source
graph G. The problem of deciding whether a subgraph is in-
cluded within another one is known as subgraph isomor-
phism, which is known to be NP-complete.
Definition 4 (Subgraph Isomorphism). Let Q = (VQ ,EQ ) and
G = (V,E) be graphs. A subgraph isomorphism from Q to
G is a function f : VQ → V such that if (u,v) ∈ EQ , then
(f(u), f(v)) ∈ E. f is an induced subgraph isomorphism if in
addition if (u,v) ∉ EQ , then (f(u), f(v)) ∉ E.
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Fig. 3 – Properties of nodes and relations.
Subgraphmatching aims at retrieving the occurrences and
does not only focus on the decision problem, as defined above
from [6].
Definition 5 (Subgraph Matching). For a graph G and a
subgraph query Q, the goal of subgraph matching is to find
every subgraph S = (VS,ES) in G such that there exists a
bijection f : VQ → VS that satisfies ∀V ∈ VQ ,TQ (v) = TS(f(v))
and ∀e = (u,v) ∈ EQ , (f(u), f(v)) ∈ ES, where TS(f(v)) represents
the label of the vertex f(v) in S.
Such pattern matching techniques are implemented in
the so-called NoSQL graph databases together with many
other features, thus allowing these frameworks to efficiently
address rogue behavior detection.
2.3. NoSQL graph databases
NoSQL graph databases [7] are based on these concepts,
attributes and values over the attributes being stored thanks
to the (key,value) paradigm which is very common in NoSQL
databases.
Fig. 3 shows a graph and its structure in (key,value) pairs.
Studies have shown that these technologies present good
performances, far better than classical relational databases,
for representing and querying such large graph databases.
There exist several NoSQL graph database engines (OrientDB,
Neo4J, HyperGraphDB, etc.) [8]. Neo4J is recognized as being
among the top engines in terms of performance [5]. It has
been recently extended for managing the successive versionsof the graph database in the Mnemosyne system described
below.
2.4. Mnemosyne: an innovative temporal data manage-
ment system
[9] aims at proposing an innovative model of history manage-
ment in NoSQL graph databases. There have been several pro-
posals in the literature for managing evolving graphs [10]. [9]
focuses on property graphs and is based on three key con-
cepts: (i) Using the graph to manage time-variant data;
(ii) Totally decoupling data historization from the represen-
tation of the data in the graph datasource; (iii) Using generic
graph traversals regardless of the graph datasource.
One of the main specificity of the Mnemosyne system is
that it uses two graphs (i) a DataGraph that is the graph
currently in use; (ii) a VersionGraph that stores the history of
different versions of a data graph. The VersionGraph model
does not depend on the DataGraph.
Fig. 4 shows an example of a DataGraph and a
VersionGraph.
In this system, every node and relation in the graph
database is tracked in the VersionGraph with a node called
TraceElement. From this node, all the modifications (insert,
update, create) are kept in a list of RevisionElements that can
be queried generically for elements (nodes or relations) of the
graph source.
Fig. 5 illustrates this proposal. In this example, three nodes
(a,b, c) and three relations (r1, r2, r3) from Fig. 6 are traced. a
(res. b, c) is the node related to node A (B,C) from Fig. 6, while
r1 (resp. r2, r3) is the node from the Version graph tracing the
versions of relation R1 (resp. R2,R3).
Rev.0 stands for the initial version of all the elements,
should they be nodes or relations.
When several modifications have occurred, the Version-
Graph becomes more complex and several revisions appear.
These revisions can be traversed with different points of view,
depending on the user needs to trace nodes or elements, as
illustrated by Fig. 7.
3. Problem statement
In this paper, we focus on malicious human actions in the
form of rogue behaviors. Such activities are known to lead to
significant financial losses.
These behaviors can be detected as they differ from regular
honest ones. Fraud detection is thus often considered as a
subtopic of anomaly detection to detect irregular activities.
Anomaly detection has been widely studied [11].
In this work, we claim that fraud data are often fundamen-
tally graphs. Fraudsters act in an indirect manner in order to
remain hidden as long as possible. Some of them may rely on
vehicles or fake corporations. Most of them operate in groups
so as to introduce a complexity and a volume of interactions
that prevent the fraud from being visible.
However, when focusing on graphs, few works have been
produced [12]. In such problems, fraudsters try to remain
hidden by acting in groups so that no action is then a direct
one. Intermediate layers are meant to hide the association of
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fraudsters. It should be noted that, if the size of the group
is too small, then the fraud can more easily be detected, but
if the size is too big, there is a higher probability of an error
occurring, whether it be caused by coincidence or caused by
a weak link in the circle of members. The size of the group
being organized for the fraud ranges from two to several.
In our work, we focus on fraud rings [13] defined as follows.
Definition 6 (Fraud Ring). Given a graph G, a fraud ring (also
known as fraud cycle) can be defined as a subgraph F ⊆ G
where there exist at least two nodes n1,n2 ∈ F that are
indirectly connected in both directions in a period of time,
with n1 − [∗]− > n2 and n2 − [∗]− > n1.
A fraud ring betrays illegal links between the nodes n1
and n2.Fig. 6 – Data graph model.
Many problems are based on fraud rings, from corruption,
insurance and bank fraud, to shell companies, etc. Even
in human resources management, some people can take
advantage of friendships or close relationships to unfairly
attain positions of power. Many works and methods have
addressed this problem but fraudsters have built innovative
practices that are not easily discovered by existing tools.
For instance, for insurance fraud, some people claim
millions of dollars after declaring fake accidents, fake
passengers and fake witnesses. Fig. 8 shows how this appears
on a graph.
Fraud rings can be retrieved by connected analysis when
for instance one person acts once as a driver and then twice
as a witness or passenger in another car accident, as shown
by SJ Moody and illustrated by Fig. 9.
3.1. Use case
We focus on the bank fraud detection as discussed in [14].
In such frauds, a circle of individuals share some legal docu-
ments and create accounts. The credit lines and accounts are
used, and gradually merged with unsecured lines.
As depicted in [14]: “One day the ring busts out,
coordinating their activity, maxing out all of their credit lines,
and disappearing. Sometimes fraudsters will go a step further
and bring all of their balances to zero using fake checks
immediately before the prior step, doubling the damage”.
For this purpose, link analysis and discrete data analysis
have been proposed and applied, for instance using the
Neo4j tools or in [15,16]. For instance it can help to retrieve
the “account holders who share more than one piece of
legitimate contact information” which is very easy when data
are represented using graph structures.
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Fig. 9 – A Fraud ring example.3.2. Problem
In this paper, we focus on the exploitation of the relations,
of the history and of the labels contained in the graph for
retrieving fraud rings. We claim that:
• history is a key feature for discovering such rings. Time is
indeed important and fraudsters are playing with delays
in order to gradually root their actions. However, time is
not always represented in the systems used to store the
information, which prevents organizations from efficiently
wiping out fraud and corruption.
• fuzziness is required as such patterns are approximate.
• many algorithms have been designed, but their implemen-
tation on real world problems and engines is not always
tractable. We thus consider the use of adapted tools with
the capabilities to express such queries in declarative lan-
guages.
The next section introduces various means to address
these points.
4. First attempt
As shown above, fraud detection relies on the discovery of
graph patterns in the successive states of the data. This
section relies on a classic example of bank fraud as depicted
in [14].
Banks and Insurance companies lose billions of dollars
every year to fraud. Traditional methods of fraud detection
play an important role in minimizing these losses. However
increasingly sophisticated fraudsters have developed a
variety of ways to elude discovery, both by working together,
and by leveraging various other means of constructing false
identities.
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circled nodes represent fraudsters and red circled nodes
represent the connection points between these people.
In this section, we first introduce a standard pattern
matching resolution to detect fraud rings in a graph. This
kind of resolution works well when all the data are available
(which means that no valuable information for resolution
has been erased or replaced). To handle this problem, there
are two main ways: (i) by embedding the history within the
operational model. This creates difficulties as the patterns for
fraud detection must then be written in an adhoc manner,
depending on the specific model; (ii) by considering a generic
model for describing the history that is compatible with
pattern matching. This allows the user to write generic
pattern matching queries for retrieving the fraud rings.
This latter case is explored by presenting how the
Mnemosyne model can help.
4.1. Pattern matching resolution
4.1.1. Classic resolution
The challenge is to determine if there is a ring in the dataset,
and if so, what is its size and what is the finacial risk it
represents. A classical solving resolution algorithm looks like
the following Listing 1.
Listing 1: Classical pattern resolution
1 MATCH ( accountHolder : AccountHolder ) -[ ] -> (←↪
contactInformation )
2 WITH contactInformation ,
3 count ( accountHolder ) AS RingSize
4 MATCH ( contactInformation ) < -[ ]−(accountHolder ) ,
5 ( accountHolder ) -[ r : HAS_CREDITCARD |←↪
HAS_UNSECUREDLOAN ] -> ( unsecuredAccount )
6 WITH collect ( DISTINCT accountHolder . UniqueId ) AS ←↪
AccountHolders ,
7 contactInformation , RingSize ,
8 SUM (CASE type ( r )
9 WHEN ’ HAS_CREDITCARD ’ THEN ←↪
unsecuredAccount . Limit
10 WHEN ’ HAS_UNSECUREDLOAN ’ THEN ←↪
unsecuredAccount . Balance
11 ELSE 0
12 END ) as FinancialRisk
13 WHERE RingSize > 1
14 RETURN AccountHolders AS FraudRing ,
15 labels ( contactInformation ) AS ContactType ,
16 RingSize ,
17 round ( FinancialRisk ) as FinancialRisk
18 ORDER BY FinancialRisk DESC
First, it finds all the account holders that have at least
one piece of information in common (line 1 to 5) and then
it calculates the ring size (line 3) and the induced financial
risk (lines 8 to 12).
The result of the execution of Listing 1 is shown in Fig. 11.
Such queries rely on the so called Cypher language which
runs as a declarative language over NoSQL graph databases.
These queries include the following clauses1:
• START: Starting points in the graph, obtained via index
lookups or by element IDs;
• MATCH: The graph pattern to match, bound to the starting
points in START;
1 See https://neo4j.com/docs/cypher-refcard/current/ for a com-
plete reference card.Fig. 10 – Fraud dataset. (For interpretation of the references
to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the
web version of this article.)
• WHERE: Filtering criteria;
• RETURN: What to return;
• CREATE: Creates nodes and relationships;
• DELETE: Removes nodes, relationships and properties;
• SET: Set values to properties;
• FOREACH: Performs updating actions once per element in
a list;
• WITH: Divides a query into multiple, distinct parts.
For instance, the following query returns all the nodes of
type accountholder:
1 MATCH ( A : ACCOUNTHOLDER )
2 RETURN A
The following query returns all the relations between two
accountholders, whatever the type of their relation:
1 MATCH ( A : ACCOUNTHOLDER ) -[ ∗ ] -> ( B : ACCOUNTHOLDER )
2 RETURN A , B
4.1.2. Resolution generalization
In fact, resolution of these kind of problems can be as general-
ized as answering this question: “Do some people share some
information?”. Expressing the query for responding to such a
question can be more generically answered with queries like:
1 MATCH ( A : ACCOUNTHOLDER ) -[ ∗ ] -> ( B : ACCOUNTHOLDER ) -[ ∗ ] -> ( C :←↪
ACCOUNTHOLDER )
2 WITH count ( accountHolder ) AS RingSize
3 RETURN A , B , C , RingSize
We can then apply this algorithm in the same manner to
other graphs that are not in the same business area.
4.2. Temporal pattern matching resolution
In this section, temporal queries rely on the Mnemosyne
model presented in Section 2.
4.2.1. Fraud ring: temporal cheating
It should be noted that expressing pattern matching defined
in Section 4.1 can be done on existing insurance/bank data as
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However, this is not always the case. Fig. 12 shows how, if
history was not managed in such systems, fraudsters can
cheat to stay hidden by creating, updating, and deleting
information over time.
In this case, the above algorithms will not detect any fraud
ring as they cannot manage history. To help organizations
to find frauds, it is thus necessary to record historical
tracks.
4.2.2. Mnemosyne extension
The Mnemosyne system presented above offers an efficient
manner to trace the history within graph data. If a node or
a relationship is impacted by an operation, should it be an
update, delete, or insert operation, then this is recorded in
another graph called VersionGraph which handles the history
of each node or relation.
It should be noted that the VersionGraph manages the
history in the same manner no matter what the business
area may be. The Mnemosyne system represents the history
in the same way despite the heterogeneity of the DataGraph
(in terms of types as well as structures of data). This is due
to the generic nature offered by the system which does not
focus on the semantics of data and which provides a strong
dissociation between the data (in the sense of information)
and the data structure.However, in this model, the representation does not
materialize the links between the impacted neighborhoods.
For instance, if a relation is added, then the incoming and
outgoing nodes are changed in the graph. All these operations
will thus be traced in the Mnemosyne VersionGraph, but no
link is traced between the elements (to manage performance
optimization).
We thus propose to materialize these links in order
to speed up the process. If a relation is updated, then
the Mnemosyne will materialize (by a relationship in the
VersionGraph) the impacted nodes and relations.
In our system, this materialization is triggered by any
change on the data, following algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Materializing Change Impacts
Data: VGi: Input Version Graph for Graph G, R ∈ G revised
relation
Result: VGr : Resulting VersionGraph
VGr ← VGi ;
foreach Input Node Ni ∈ G such that Ni − R− > ∗ do
CREATE materialized relation ni− > r in VGr
foreach Output Node NO ∈ G such that ∗ − R− > NO do
CREATE materialized relation r− > no in VGr
Fig. 13 presents an example of such a situation,
with the blue relationships representing the materialized
relationships which are added.
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colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)4.2.3. Resolution
Resolving such patterns in NoSQL graph databases requires
the definition of original queries. Such queries are built
to navigate in the graph and historical graph (Mnemosyne
VersionGraph) in order to retrieve the fraud rings. The
efficiency of the system relies on the NoSQL engine.
Listing 2 shows how to query all the links from the history
in order to retrieve the potential fraud ring.
Listing 2: Exploiting Historical Revisions
1 match ( TEAH1 : TraceElement ) , ( TEAH2 : TraceElement )
2 with TEAH1 , TEAH2
3 match p=(TEAH1 ) -[ ∗1 . . 7 ]−(TEAH2 )
4 where all ( rel IN relationships ( p ) where type ( rel ) <> ’←↪
REVISION ’ )
5 return TEAH1 , TEAH2 , extract ( rel IN relationships ( p ) | ←↪
type ( rel ) )
As shown in this Cypher query, all the elements impacted
on the graph can easily be retrieved by exploiting the
materialized links of the history from the extension we
propose. The result of this query is displayed in Fig. 14.
However, we claim that the patterns to be found cannot be
defined in a crisp manner and propose below an extension to
fuzzy historical patterns.
5. Fuzzy historical pattern matching resolu-
tion
In many cases, the parameters of the patterns cannot be
defined in a strict manner. For instance, the minimum and
maximum size of the fraud ring are fuzzy parameters. In
the same manner, the time delays between the fraudsters’
actions are fuzzy.We thus propose using fuzzy clauses in the pattern
matching queries.
5.1. Defining fuzzy clauses
Fuzzy queries have been extensively studied in the literature,
mainly on relational databases and more recently on NoSQL
gaph databases. The propositions can either address classical
crisp databases [17] or fuzzy graphs [18,19].
Temporal fuzzy clauses can be defined either by
considering the fuzzy Allen intervals or by considering user
defined clauses. User can define temporal graduation such as
“some days” and “several weeks”. Fig. 15 draws amembership
function defining “several weeks”. This membership function
defines a degree of membership of a number of weeks to the
term “several weeks”. For instance, 3 weeks has a degree of
membership of 1 but more than 5 weeks as a lower degree of
membership (may be months could be a better term?).
An implementation of the membership function of Fig. 15
has been made and named “fuzzyWeeks”. This membership
function is used in the query of Listing 3.
Listing 3: Fuzzy Pattern Matching on Fuzzy Weeks
1 match ( TEAH1 : TraceElement ) , ( TEAH2 : TraceElement )
2 with TEAH1 , TEAH2
3 match p=(TEAH1 ) -[ ∗1 . . 7 ]−(TEAH2 )
4 where all ( rel IN relationships ( p ) where type ( rel ) <> ’←↪
REVISION ’ ) and severalWeeks ( p ) > 0 . 7
5 return TEAH1 , TEAH2 , extract ( rel IN relationships ( p ) | ←↪
type ( rel ) )
Fuzzy pattern matching can also be applied on relation-
ships. Rings can be characterized in the same way as the
length of the paths forming the relations. Finding the size of
a path can be accomplished as shown is Listing 4; the ring
ranges within fuzzy bounds, as shown on Listing 5; the result
is displayed in Fig. 16.
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1 match ( TEAH1 : TraceElement ) , ( TEAH2 : TraceElement )
2 with TEAH1 , TEAH2
3 match p=(TEAH1 ) -[ ∗1 . . 7 ]−(TEAH2 )
4 where all ( rel IN relationships ( p ) where type ( rel ) <> ’←↪
REVISION ’ )
5 return TEAH1 , TEAH2 , extract ( rel IN relationships ( p ) | ←↪
type ( rel ) ) , length ( p )
Listing 5: Fuzzy Pattern Matching on Fuzzy Lengths
1 match ( TEAH1 : TraceElement ) , ( TEAH2 : TraceElement )
2 with TEAH1 , TEAH2
3 match p=(TEAH1 ) -[ ∗1 . . 7 ]−(TEAH2 )
4 where all ( rel IN relationships ( p ) where type ( rel ) <> ’←↪
REVISION ’ )
5 return TEAH1 , TEAH2 , extract ( rel IN relationships ( p ) | ←↪
type ( rel ) ) , fuzzyDist ( p )
5.2. Generalizing fuzzy clause to handle any rogue
behavior
The main drawback of the solution presented above is
that for each specific need a new function has to be
developed (e.g. fuzzyWeek, fuzzyDistance). This means that
for each fuzzy clause, it is necessary to define a hard coded
membership function.
This lack of genericity has highlighted the need for
improvements that can adapt the detection to each rogue
behavior.
To do so, it is necessary to offer the user the ability (i) to
propose high level definition of fuzzy terms (ii) to use this
definitions inside a declarative graph pattern matching query
language.
5.2.1. Fuzzy linguistic terms definition in behavioral anoma-
lies detection
Searching for anomalies detection means searching for links
between some data. There are different kinds of links such
as relational links (is there some relation, may it be direct
or indirect, that can rely this person A with person B?),Fig. 15 – Trapezoidal membership function of the fuzzy set
severalWeeks.
temporal links (have event e1 and event e2 happened in the
same temporal frame?), geographical links, etc. Each of this
dimension has its own vocabulary and its own graduation.
What has been previously proposed in this article is a
high level pattern matching system that uses the genericity
of the underlying versioning system to detect anomalies in
suspicious patterns. This approach has been enriched in the
beginning of this section with the use of fuzzy functions that
account for the fact that parameters cannot always be defined
in a strict manner, especially when searching for behavioral
anomalies.
In the remainder of this section, the goal is to define and
provide a system that offers to the user the ability to define
his/her own terms definition according to his/her functional
specific domain.
We propose the use of linguistic terms and more generally
linguistic variables to express domain concerns. Every term
will be associated to a membership function offering the
ability to define fuzzy linguistic terms and variables.
Definition 7 (Fuzzy Linguistic Variables). Fuzzy linguistic vari-
ables can be defined using fuzzy sets. A fuzzy linguistic vari-
able V is defined as a quadruple of the form V = (X,U,T,MF),
where X is the name of V,U is the domain (universe) of V,T
represents the set of fuzzy subsets defined in U, andMF repre-
sents the membership functions that characterize each fuzzy
subset defined in T.
5.2.2. Fuzzy linguistic terms grammar
To express linguistic terms, we rely on our previous defined
work on fuzzy logic and our previous implementations based
on functional programming.
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model parsers as functions and to define higher-order
functions (also called combinators) that implement grammar
constructions such as sequencing, choice, and repetition. As
explained in [20], the basic idea dates back to 1970s [21] and
has become popular since the 1980s in a variety of functional
programming languages [22–24].
The parsing expression grammar we chose to express
fuzzy linguistic variale is defined in Listing 6.
Listing 6: Fuzzy DSL syntax PEG
1 def number : Parser [ Double ] = """−?\d+ ( \ . \ d∗ ) ? """
2 def point : Parser [ Point ] = " ( " ~> number ~ " , " ~ number←↪
<~ " ) "
3 def functionName : Parser [ String ] = """ trian | trape | gauss←↪
| gbel l | sigm"""
4 def parameters = rep1 ( point ) | rep1 ( number )
5 def memberfunction = functionName . ? ~ parameters
6 def termName = """ [ a−zA−Z ] \w∗ """
7 def term = "TERM" ~> termName ~ " := " ~ memberfunction ←↪
<~ " ; "
8 def variableName = """ [ a−zA−Z ] \w∗ """
9 def fuzzyVariable = "FUZZIFY" ~> variableName ~ rep1 (←↪
term ) <~ "END_FUZZIFY"
Listing 7 and 8 gives the definition of two linguistic terms
“temporal” and “distance” that will be used in the next
section (see Fig. 17).
Listing 7: Fuzzy linguistic definition of week
1
2 FUZZIFY week
3 TERM one := trian 0 1 2;
4 TERM several := trape 0 2 5 8;
5 TERM many := ( 5 , 0 ) ( 8 , 1 ) ;
6 END_FUZZIFY
Listing 8: Fuzzy linguistic definition of depth
1 FUZZIFY depth
2 TERM low := trian 0 1 2;
3 TERM middle := trian 1 3 5;
4 TERM high := ( 3 , 0 ) ( 5 , 1 ) ;
5 END_FUZZIFYFig. 17 – Representation of Listing 7.
5.2.3. Using a rogue definition
The Cypher language does not allow the use of fuzzy defini-
tions. To do so, it is necessary to extend the language. Discus-
sion about extending a graph pattern matching declarative
language has been done in [17]. Cypherf, standing for Cypher
fuzzy, is an extension of the cypher language that allows the
user to use fuzzy linguistic terms such as those defined in the
previous section. The available functions are listed below:
• Fuzzy (µf , value): returns the degree of membership to µf
function
– µf is expressed as a String that describes the
membership function with the Fuzzy DSL
– value is expressed as a Double.
• FuzzyLT (fuzzyVariable, value): returns a collection that
contains for every fuzzy term of the fuzzy linguistic
variable two properties: the name of the term and the
degree of membership of “value” to the term. For instance,
for a value X and a fuzzy linguistic variable serveralWeeks =
(Week, [0,∞], {one, several,many}, {µone, µseveral, µmany}) the
result will be:
1 {
2 { name : " one " , degree :µone(x) } ,
3 { name : " several " , degree :µseveral(x) } ,
4 { name : " many " , degree :µmany(x) }
5 }
– fuzzyVariable: is expressed as a String that defines the
fuzzy variable. This definition is composed of the name
of the fuzzy variable and a set of fuzzy terms. Every fuzzy
term is defined by its name and its membership function
– value is expressed as a Double
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a TNorms of name “tnormName” on expression1 and
expression2
• TCoNorms (type, expression1, expression2): same as
TNorms but this time for t-conorms.
Two examples are provided in Listings 9 and 10. Listing
9 returns the couples of nodes (TEAH1 and TEAH2) and the
relation characterizing with the highest score (HEAD) their
link. TEAH1 and TEAH2 are linked with p (line 3). For this
purpose, it computes the membership degree for every term
of the fuzzy variable depth using the fuzzyLT function.
Listing 10 returns the same type of result but only if the
membership degree is greater than 0.7 (line 6) which prevents
unrelevant results to be displayed.
Listing 9: Fuzzy PatternMatching on Fuzzy Lengths with fuzzy
linguistic terms
1 match ( TEAH1 : TraceElement ) , ( TEAH2 : TraceElement )
2 with TEAH1 , TEAH2
3 match p=(TEAH1 ) -[ ∗1 . . 7 ]−(TEAH2 )
4 where all ( rel IN relationships ( p ) where type ( rel ) <> ’←↪
REVISION ’ )
5
6 return TEAH1 , TEAH2 , extract ( rel IN relationships ( p ) | ←↪
type ( rel ) ) , head ( fuzzyLT ( " / tmp / depth . fl" , size ( p ) ) )
Listing 10: Fuzzy Pattern Matching on Fuzzy Lengths with
selection on fuzzy linguistic terms degree
1 MATCH ( TEAH1 : TraceElement ) , ( TEAH2 : TraceElement )
2 WITH TEAH1 , TEAH2
3 MATCH p=(TEAH1 ) -[ ∗1 . . 7 ]−(TEAH2 )
4 WITH p , head ( fuzzyLT ( " / tmp / distance . fl" , size ( p ) ) ) as ←↪
dist
5 WHERE all ( rel IN relationships ( p ) where type ( rel ) <> ’←↪
REVISION ’ )
6 AND dist . degree > 0 . 7
7 return TEAH1 , TEAH2 , extract ( rel IN relationships ( p ) | ←↪
type ( rel ) ) ,
In this section fuzzy historical pattern matching has been
introduced. Both a first implementation and a generalization
have been done with some running examples. A grammar
has been presented and the relevance of the use of fuzzy
historical pattern matching in fraud ring detection has been
addressed.
The next section presents the related work on frauds,
fuzzy and temporal graph data.
6. Related work
Fraud detection has been a hot topic for many years as
its impact is extensive in many fields and sectors such as
industry, finance, bank, insurance, organized and corporate
crime, health care, etc.
Rogue behaviors can be detected using several methods.
The most common ones from the literature are based on
statistical methods, pattern recognition, expert systems and
machine learning [25]. These techniques can be applied on
several kinds of data such as time series or transactional data,
depending on the type of context being considered: computer
intrusion, credit card fraud, telecommunication fraud, etc.
However there are only few works on graph data.6.1. Frauds and detection
Rogue behaviors and frauds are defined in the literature
in various ways. The main characteristics are related to
the fact that such behaviors refer to criminal deceptions
through intentional human practices and interactions aiming
at dishonest advantages.
Fraud detection relies on methods for anomaly detection.
Such anomalies can be seen as outliers and are thus retrieved
by comparing regular and fraudulent situations.
This comparison can be achieved using supervised
learning [26] or cases can be separated using statistical and
clustering methods [27].
Algorithms have been defined for several types of data
sources. Transactional and stream data have been extensively
addressed, especially for dealing with bank and finance
frauds and can be regarded as outlier detection in stream
data [28].
As frauds are generated by humans, their characteristics
are often impossible to define in a crisp manner. For this rea-
son, many works have addressed the use of soft computing
and formal representations of imprecision and uncertainty.
[29] reviews the main methods from intelligent systems
that can help, from fuzzy neural networks to genetic
algorithms. [30] proposes the use of fuzzy clustering in the
particular context of corporate fraud. [31] focuses on auction
frauds and proposes the use of fuzzy rules that are optimized
by genetic algorithms.
Regarding graph-based data, outlier detection has been
less addressed as it is much more complex. Recent works
have addressed the detection of outliers in graph streams [32]
and temporal data and graphs [33].
However, no work has addressed fuzzy fraud ring
detection from temporal graph data.
In order to detect frauds from such graph data, graph
pattern must be considered.
6.2. Graph pattern matching
Graph pattern matching is distinguished from graph mining
where frequent subgraphs are searched for [34,35].
[36] addresses several topics within the framework of the
approximate graph matching problem, as for instance the
computation of the distance between two graphs.
Temporal queries have been studied since the beginning of
databases, in relational databases [37], data warehouses [38]
and Web data [39,40]. However, very few works have been
proposed to represent and query history in graph-oriented
NoSQL databases [41].
Many works on temporal queries are based on the Allen
interval algebra [42] recalled in Fig. 18. In this framework,
A = [a−,a+] and B = [b−,b+] are two intervals of dates
(for instance, A1 = [January2013,March2013] and B1 =
[February2013, June2013]) and some predicates are defined on
A and B which can hold up or not depending on tests over the
boundaries a−,a+,b−,b+ (for instance before(A1,B1) does not
hold as March2013 > February2013).
Temporal SQL has been extensively studied, and has
been fuzzified [43] to describe for instance that the event B
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intervals.
occurs long before event A, or that event A occurs before or
approximately at the same date as the event B.
For all the above-mentioned topics, graphs can be queried
through languages. Some of them have been studied in the
literature. Some languages have been proposed by scientists
and some other ones have been issued by the editors.
[44] proposes a survey of all the languages defined over
the last 25 years, where subgraph matching appears to be
one of the most powerful and necessary query, including
approximate matching.
[45] proposes a propositional dynamic logic that extends
several graph database languages.
[46] introduces GraphQL, a graph algebra capable of taking
into account nodes, relations, and attributes on both nodes
and relations. In this language, the authors define the so-
called graph pattern as a pair P = (M,F ) whereM is a graph
motif and F is a predicate on the attributes of the motif.
The algebra contains several operations, including selection,
Cartesian product, join and composition. It also demonstrates
that their algebra is contained into Datalog, thus allowing for
rewriting their queries in Datalog.
7. Conclusion and further work
Rogue behaviors often amount to human abnormal interac-
tions also called fraud rings. We thus discuss in this paper how
property graphs can help for rogue behavior detection by fo-
cusing on interactions. We focus on NoSQL graph databases
that offer a useful framework to deal with large graph-based
datasets. This paper extends [47] which has introduced a first
attempt to NoSQL graph queries for rogue detection. It puts
the emphasis on the use of fuzzy queries in order to better
address the approximate definitions inherent in such human
activities. This paper introduces the use of a Domain Specific
Language and a declarative fuzzy query language (Cypherf) to
better address and resolve sophisticated cases.
The use of NoSQL graph databases is a key element of our
work. We especially claim that representing the successive
versions of the graph data allows to better retrieve the chains
of successive transactions that represent a fraud. For this
purpose, we consider using the Mnemosyne system that has
been extended for materializing temporal relations betweenobjects. This allows us to directly apply pattern matching on
the graph for retrieving the fraud rings.
Further works aim at integrating the contribution from
this paper to alert systems, especially on stream data.
For instance, it would then be possible to build follow-
up systems for organized crime or terrorist rings which
have particular behaviors such as “gathering-dispersal-
reorganization” dynamics. Such chains appear for example
when fraudsters assemble for illicit activities and then
suddenly disperse to face either an internal or external threat.
Inside threats occur in case of betrayal, the subsequent
regrouping often being reorganized in order to destroy the
betrayal (settling of scores). External threats may be due to
police investigations.
Such a system may then be used for early fraud detection
in order to prevent frauds before they occur.
For all these works, the volume and complexity of data
and treatments may challenge the limits of the current
implementation. For this reason, we aim at investigating the
use of in-memory graph processing systems.
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